In
his book “Anarchy, State, and Utopia” Robert Nozick (1974)
launched his argument on the psychological implausibility
of utilitarianism aptly illustrated in a machine that
can be programmed with a variety of happy experiences
and, through brain stimulation can produce any series
of experiences one may desire.
"Suppose there were an experience machine that would
give you any experience you desired. Superduper neuropsychologists
could stimulate your brain so that you would think and
feel you were writing a great novel, or making a friend,
or reading an interesting book. All the time you would
be floating in a tank, with electrodes attached to your
brain. Should you plug into this machine for life, preprogramming
your life experiences? [...] Of course, while in the tank
you won't know that you're there; you'll think that it's
all actually happening [...] Would you plug in?"
(pp. 42-43)
By repeatedly asking the question “would you plug in?”,
Nozick underscores the rationality of deciding whether
to plug in or not. If one cares only for pleasure that
the quality of experience the experience machine promises,
then it would be irrational for him not to plug in (Arneson,
1999). Refusal to plug in indicates that one has other
aims or desires other than pleasure and enjoyment. But
utilitarian ethics implies that the best possible decision
would be to plug in.
Nozick’s critical strategy involves an isolation approach
where he isolates pleasure as the only thing valuable
in life, with other desires being subservient. Since nothing
else matters except pleasure being the sole intrinsic
value, a life of pleasures made possible through an experience
machine, for example, would be a great life. However,
intuitively, such a life would not be great. Therefore,
pleasure is not the intrinsic value
Utilitarian considerations seem to ignore the inviolable
rights of individuals. Thus, Nozick argues that it is
wrong to violate one person’s rights to produce a greater
good. For example, to kill one person to avoid the killing
of a few would be wrong. Following Kantian ethics, Nozick
also upholds that individuals must be treated as ends
in themselves not as “mere means,” or tools. Based on
the inherent value of all persons, ethics should instead
be founded on respect for another person’s life and autonomy
and dictate that human action and decision should consider
individual value responsive to people’s value, enhancing
and supporting it, and enabling it to flourish (Nozick,
2001, p.281).
References
Arneson, R. J. (1999). Human flourishing versus desire
satisfaction. Social Philosophy and Policy, 16, 1. Retrieved
November 28, 2008, from http://philosophy.ucsd.edu/faculty/rarneson/flour4.pdf.
Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, state, and utopia. New York:
Basic Books.
Nozick, R. (2001). Invariances: The structure of the objective
world. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press.
The Internet Encylopedia of Philosophy. Jeremy Bentham.
Retrieved November 28, 2008, from http://www.iep.utm.edu/b/bentham.htm
Cultural Relativism
Anchored
on the cogency of a particular culture in molding the
moral values and beliefs of its members, cultural relativism
holds that all cultures, however diverse they may be,
are of equal value and that every culture adopts its own
ethical or moral system to regulate the behavior of its
members. Cultural relativism proposes that since there
exists no universal moral code or value standards that
holds true for all cultures, a group’s system of beliefs,
morals, customs and actions should be understood in the
light of the social perspective in which “cultural learning”
(Herskovits, p. 93) took place. Mannheim (1936, p. 125)
asserts that a person’s way of thinking is structured
by “social position" and “cultural setting”. Since
cultural norms determine the way in which people view
what is morally acceptable and unacceptable, what may
be considered right or good in one culture may be considered
wrong or bad in another culture (Tilley, 1994, p. 1).
For example, the self-mutilation and human sacrifice practice
of Mayan civilization or the polygamous traditions of
some cultures are to be evaluated based on specific cultural
realms.
Frank Boas’ work on anthropological research engendered
the term cultural relativism based on his broader definition
of culture encompassing not just religious beliefs, art
and music but also the entire gamut of individual and
collective “mental and physical reactions and activities”
in relation to their “natural environment, to other groups,
to members of the group itself, and of each individual
to himself” (Boas, 1963, p. 149). This perspective that
all cultures are equally legitimate expressions of human
existence inspired a progression of methodical approaches
to in-depth cultural analysis that treated cultures at
their distinctive terms and merits. Perhaps, this and
the emergence of objective ethnography that came to blows
with “ethnocentrism” could be considered as the most significant
contributions of cultural relativism (Glazer, 1994).
The disadvantages of cultural relativism are propounded
by its critics who claim that adopting a neutral moral
or ethical position on certain events based on the relativist
notion that all truth is objective would be precarious
to the conduct of world affairs. For example, cultural
relativism would discourage us to pass judgment on significant
world events or on those that repulsed the moral sense
of humankind such as the Nazi holocaust, the ethnic genocide
in East Timor, or incest traditions of some religious
sects. The pejorative effect would of having no “moral
court of appeals” would be to resort to “power” or “might”
Holmes, 1984, pp. 17-18). The cultural relativist’s assertion
that all truth is local also fails to address the fact
of cultural overlapping where people live in more than
one cultures and therefore are influenced by differing
moral perspectives. In a way, cultural relativism also
discourages cultural reform because it implicitly upholds
negative customs and traditions.
However, Kluckhohn (1994, p.43) insists that cultural
relativism does not deny “moral absolutes” and does not
warrant savage behaviors but instead allows a proper analysis
of the “appropriateness” of negative customs in relation
to how they fit the cultural context.
References
Boas, F. (1963).The mind of primitive man. New York: Collier
Books.
Glazer, M. (1994). Cultural relativism. The University
of Texas-Pan American. Retrieved November 27, 2008, from
http://www.utpa.edu/faculty/mglazer/Theory/cultural_relativism.htm
Herskovits, M. (1973). Cultural relativism: Perspectives
in cultural pluralism. New York: Vintage Books.
Holmes, A. (1984). Ethics. Illinois: InterVarsity Press.
Kluckhohn, C. (1944). Mirror for man. Greenwick, CT: Fawcett.
Mannheim, K. (1936). Ideology and utopia. New York: Harcourt,
Brace
Tilley, J. (1994). Cultural relativism and tolerance.
Lyceum. Volume VI, No. 1. Retrieved November 27, 2008,
from http://lyceumphilosophy.com/Lyceum-6-1.pdf.
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